What's going on in Turkey: A Structural Analysis of the March 19th Intervention

On March 18th 2025, Ekrem İmamoğlu confronted the revocation of his diploma pursuant to a decision by the Istanbul University Administrative Board. Subsequently, predicated on a prosecutor's indictment articulating exceptionally grave accusations, he was arrested in the pre-dawn hours of March 19th, at approximately 5 AM.

The events of March 19th constituted more than the singular arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu; they represented an expansive punitive operation targeting nearly one hundred high-level bureaucrats within the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İBB). This cohort notably included Murat Ongun, widely perceived in the public sphere as İmamoğlu’s principal aide; Necati Özkan, credited as the architect of the successful 2019 electoral campaign; Murat Çalık, the Mayor of Beylikdüzü—the municipality from which İmamoğlu had ascended to the metropolitan mayorship; Resul Emrah Şahan, the Mayor of Şişli and a close associate from İmamoğlu’s previous term; Mahir Polat, an art and architectural historian serving as the İBB Deputy Secretary-General, who had narrowly lost the Fatih mayoral contest in the preceding election; and Mehmet Ali Çalışkan, director of the Reform Institute—effectively İmamoğlu's think tank—a figure well-regarded within civil society and social research circles.

The morning of March 19th witnessed not only the apprehension of Ekrem İmamoğlu and his extensive retinue but also the arrest of journalist İsmail Saymaz. He was charged with attempting to subvert the constitutional order, ostensibly for lending support to the Gezi protests—a protest movement initiated and concluded twelve years prior. In ensuing demonstrations, and particularly following the call for a commercial boycott post-April 2nd holiday—targeting enterprises overtly aligned with the incumbent government—hundreds were detained. While a subset secured release within days, others were remanded to correctional facilities, where they currently face trial under detention.

Istanbul's Socio-Spatial Transformation and Urban Policy

A nuanced understanding of Turkey's macro-political transformations necessitates an examination of the historical trajectory of socio-economic and socio-spatial configurations within Istanbul's urban milieu. Commencing in the 1950s, the accelerated process of urbanization precipitated the emergence of informal residential zones (gecekondu settlements) on Istanbul's periphery, which materialized as spatial manifestations of Turkey's demographic, economic, and political metamorphosis. Integrated into the urban system via incremental mechanisms until the 1980s, these settlements subsequently became focal points of class-based and spatial segregation concurrent with the implementation of neoliberal urban policies.

Istanbul’s distinctive urban political ecology, particularly salient in the post-1980 epoch, mirrors the spatialization of capital accumulation processes. Within the developmental paradigms conceptualized by Harvey as "entrepreneurial urbanism," by Molotch as the "growth machine," and by Professor Çağlar Keyder as the "globalizing city," Istanbul's urban terrain consolidated its position as the locus of national and international capital accumulation. The post-2002 period, especially, saw the most conspicuous instantiations of a construction-centric economic growth model actualized in Istanbul; urban transformation initiatives, mega-projects, and public-private partnerships operated as the spatial instrumentation of a novel capital accumulation regime.

Urban Space and Municipalities as a Redistributive Mechanism

The enactment of legislation sanctioning condominium ownership in apartment structures in 1965 instantaneously positioned municipalities—entities responsible for establishing such property regimes in major Western cities and subsequently in Turkey—as stewards of a substantial apparatus of accumulation. Amidst the period demarcated by the military interventions of March 12, 1971, and September 12, 1980—an era wherein Turkey confronted the most egregious facets of the Cold War—the opportunity to fully apprehend the scale, function, and ramifications of this development was absent. Subsequent to 1983, under the democratic order reconstituted by Turgut Özal and decisively oriented towards the neoliberal camp, municipalities readily assumed the role of primary allocators of urban land rent. Following a transient local governance phase under the SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party—successor to the CHP post-September 12th proscription) in 1989, the year 1994 marked the ascendancy of the Islamist-nationalist right in local administrations across the nation. Over the ensuing quarter-century, spanning from 1994 to 2019, the paramount achievement of the Islamist-nationalist right coalition lay in instigating a virtually unconstrained process of rent extraction across the urban landscape.

The 2019 local elections signify a juncture at which this established urban regime experienced significant perturbation. An analysis of İmamoğlu's vote distribution at the mahalle (neighborhood) level reveals a discernible deviation from conventional electoral patterns across Istanbul's heterogeneous socio-spatial formations (e.g., the historic urban core, peripheral gecekondu-transformed districts, middle-class residential areas, coastal zones). Wacquant's concept regarding the evolution of marginality finds particular resonance here, serving as an index of social mobility engendered by deepening urban contradictions. Observations gleaned from social media subsequent to March 19th provide compelling evidence of İmamoğlu engaging, perhaps for the first time, with this marginalized demographic. Should Turkey undergo genuine democratization, İmamoğlu's capacity to transcend the symbolic E-5 highway divide and exert influence within Istanbul's most populous working-class mahalles will undoubtedly constitute a crucial domain for sociological inquiry—a potentially invaluable empirical case study for future scholarship.

Mapping the Istanbul Elections

The accompanying cartographic representation illustrates the fluctuations in Ekrem İmamoğlu's vote share at the mahalle scale between the March 31st and June 23rd, 2019, electoral contests. Its most salient feature is the CHP's transgression of a line of marginality previously unbreached since 1977, evidenced by the pronounced surge in votes north of the E-5 highway corridor on both the Anatolian and European littorals.

This map forms an integral component of a forthcoming scholarly article. Within that work, my analytical focus centers specifically on the protracted 84-day electoral cycle spanning March 31st to June 23rd. This period, setting aside the influence of the Kurdish political movement, offered the clearest vantage point from which to observe İmamoğlu's distinct political impact. Were the ascendance of İmamoğlu—and subsequently the CHP—solely attributable to the Kurdish electorate, as asserted initially with reservation and later with considerable vehemence by governmental and right-leaning circles, the dynamism depicted in this map would be inexplicable.

İmamoğlu surmounted a seemingly insuperable threshold simultaneously from two distinct constituencies. Initially, he garnered significant support in districts characterized by substantial Kurdish populations, notably Sultanbeyli, Bağcılar, and Esenyurt. Subsequently, he secured comparable gains in areas predominantly inhabited by middle-class Turks—such as Üsküdar, Çekmeköy, Sancaktepe, the expansive district of Küçükçekmece, Halkalı, Güngören, and even Eyüp—localities that had, for years, exhibited a stronger affinity towards conservatism.

The cartographic representation utilizes variations in background coloration to specifically denote increases in vote percentage. The political realignment witnessed between March 31st and June 23rd is now manifesting across the entirety of Turkey. We are currently situated within a moment characterized by a widespread reaction against perceived injustices, a sentiment now arguably exceeding the measurement capacity of conventional polling methodologies.

In this context, Istanbul assumes critical importance. Turkey presents as a nation characterized by significant geographical, demographic, cultural, and—perhaps to a lesser extent—economic segmentation. Yet, if a singular urban entity can be said to encapsulate the full 780,000 square kilometers of the national territory, it is unequivocally Istanbul. Within its bounds reside representations of Rize, Hopa, Birecik, Şarköy, Bodrum, Aksaray, and Karaman. Intriguingly, these diverse origins coexist in proportions that collectively approximate the demographic composition of Turkey itself, albeit with a discernible preponderance of influence from the Black Sea region.

Historically, Istanbul has functioned as the epicenter of Turkey's democratic progression, economic expansion, global integration, multicultural expression, and cosmopolitan ideation. This role extends back approximately 1800 years, even to its antecedent identity as Byzantion, a relatively unremarkable city within the Roman Empire. Nonetheless, the recent events represent a conjuncture of profound tragedy, comparable only to circumstances witnessed during periods of military coups. Excluding Kadir Topbaş, Erdoğan's own appointee, incumbent Istanbul mayors have never been forcibly removed from office during eras of civilian governance. Erdoğan himself faced dismissal during the hybrid political regime established following the February 28th process. Ekrem İmamoğlu thus became only the second Istanbul metropolitan mayor to be unseated by political authorities since the reinstatement of municipal governance post-1960, a category that includes dismissals during the September 12th and March 12th coup regimes.

Competitive Authoritarianism and the Crisis of Urban Governance

Even for observers intimately acquainted with Turkey, individuals like ourselves who have borne witness to the myriad fluctuations and the pervasive corrosive, injurious, and destructive interventions of the preceding fifteen years, the events of March 19th registered as a profound shock. One might have posited that, lacking any substantive democratization since 2013, the accumulation of such political blows had perhaps attenuated their individual significance.

March 19th was accurately characterized as a coup within the broad opposition public discourse. The term "darbe" (coup) arguably undergoes semantic attenuation in direct English translation; it does not conform to the strict definition of a "coup d'état," which presupposes an intent by the perpetrators to seize state power. Instead, the situation involved an intervention by an entrenched oligarchic faction, already possessing comprehensive control over state apparatuses, designed to preclude any possibility of change via democratic processes.

The conceptual framework of "competitive authoritarianism," as articulated by Levitsky and Way, offers a salient analytical lens through which to interpret Turkey's recent regime characteristics. This regime typology acknowledges the nominal persistence of democratic institutions while highlighting how asymmetries in resource allocation favoring the incumbent power, pervasive media control, and undue influence over the judiciary effectively vitiate the conditions necessary for fair competition. The İmamoğlu affair exemplifies a case wherein the boundaries of competitive authoritarianism are palpably tested, particularly within the local governance sphere.

Levitsky and Way define competitive authoritarian regimes as systems where "formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy." Their analysis encompasses 1990s case studies such as Croatia (Tudjman), Serbia (Milošević), Russia (Putin), Peru (Fujimori), and Haiti, alongside Albania, Armenia, Ghana, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, and Zambia. Adopting Juan Linz's perspective, they argue against classifying these regimes as merely "deficient" or "low-intensity" democracies, proposing instead that they constitute a distinct modality of (low-intensity) authoritarianism.

Levitsky and Way differentiate competitive authoritarianism from both fully institutionalized democracies and comprehensive authoritarian systems. Modern democratic regimes adhere to four minimal criteria: 1) selection of executive and legislative bodies through open, free, and fair elections; 2) near-universal adult suffrage; 3) extensive protection of political rights and civil liberties, encompassing freedoms of the press, association, and critique of government without fear of reprisal; and 4) genuine governing authority vested in elected officials, unencumbered by military or clerical tutelage. In established democracies, transgressions of these criteria are typically neither sufficiently widespread nor systematic to fundamentally distort the competitive landscape between government and opposition.

In their scholarly contributions of 2016 and 2019, Berk Esen and Şebnem Gümüşçü provided detailed accounts of Turkey's trajectory into competitive authoritarianism, elucidating its multifaceted nature. They further emphasized how the potential exit from this regime type became particularly manifest during the forcibly repeated Istanbul Metropolitan Mayoral election of 2019.

Istanbul's model of urban governance, especially following the 2019 elections, has become an arena of pronounced tension between central and local authorities. The İmamoğlu administration's pursuit of participatory governance strategies, its initiatives to bolster engagement mechanisms at the mahalle level, and its articulation of an urban justice discourse collectively presented an alternative paradigm to the hegemonic urban policies of the central government. Interpreted through the theoretical framework of Jessop's "strategic-relational state theory," this tension could be construed as a spatial manifestation of the power dynamics inherent within the state apparatus itself. However, absent further evidence, such an interpretation remains largely speculative.

A readily discernible, plausible rationale for the timing of this attempted civilian coup remains elusive. Over three years remain until the next scheduled elections; the governing parties possess a relatively secure position within the parliamentary arithmetic, augmented even by a faction of MPs who defected from the opposition. Furthermore, a peace accord with the Kurdish movement, potentially the first substantive agreement in many years, appeared to have been achieved. Despite having developed a degree of explanatory coherence regarding preceding political maneuvers, as elaborated below, the underlying motivations for this latest, significantly more drastic action remain opaque.

This analysis is undertaken from the perspective of a sociologist. I maintain collegial relationships with numerous individuals arrested alongside İmamoğlu, having encountered several within professional contexts; they represent individuals of considerable merit and personal integrity. This text, however, is not intended as a political polemic. Rather, it endeavors to evaluate the current trajectory as Turkey potentially navigates an exit from the condition of competitive authoritarianism.

The Unending Crisis: The Normalization of Crisis

Until the closing years of the 2010s, Turkey occupied a position often cited as exemplary among emerging market economies. While consistently falling short of the desired Chinese model of achieving an external trade surplus, the nation possessed mechanisms to offset its external deficit, primarily through tourism revenues supplemented by foreign direct investment. It maintained a relatively democratic framework, facilitated the inflow of low-cost labor from its eastern regions, and successfully attracted investment from Gulf states. Its demographic profile featured a youthful, comparatively well-educated populace capable of sustained labor under demanding conditions.

Turkey had also completed a profound, albeit frequently overlooked or misconstrued, societal transformation: urbanization. By 2010, over 80% of the population resided in urban locales. Incorporating peri-urban and highly urbanized zones, particularly in the western regions, reduced the rural demographic to less than 10% of the total. This urban majority enjoyed generally adequate provision, largely via market mechanisms, of housing, essential consumer goods, fundamental social services, and critically, educational opportunities extending to the tertiary level.

Consequently, the first half of the 2010s could arguably be characterized, at least in economic terms, as a veritable golden age for Turkey, unparalleled since the latter half of the 1960s. The accompanying visualization presents inflation data compiled from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK) for the past two decades. Given the limited explanatory power of annual inflation figures, a collation of monthly data is presented here, posited as a more revealing analytical model. Examination of the heatmap format, in particular—even acknowledging potential data inaccuracies—affords a lucid depiction of the critical inflection points and ruptures within this economic trajectory.

The inflation heatmap provides compelling visual evidence of the direct correlation between Turkey's democratic trajectory and its economic expansion. Following the substantial 6.3% monthly inflation registered in September 2018, concurrent with significant currency depreciation, the leadership of TÜİK underwent repeated changes. Against this backdrop, the electoral victories secured by İmamoğlu in March and June 2019 emerged as outcomes that were unforeseen yet arguably inevitable.

In contrast to the anticipations of optimistic segments of the polity, including myself, who viewed either İmamoğlu or Ankara Metropolitan Mayor Mansur Yavaş as the presumptive presidential nominee for the opposition in the May 14, 2023, elections, a specific faction within the opposition effectively neutralized its political messaging through the "Altılı Masa" (Table of Six) construct. This group demonstrated a notable lack of awareness regarding the profound economic impasse signaled by the officially reported monthly inflation rate of 13.58% in December 2021. Furthermore, their actions succeeded in foreclosing virtually all avenues for genuine political competition. While an inflation figure of 13.58%—even acknowledging potential inaccuracies—might precipitate significant political transformations in other democratic contexts, this particular opposition clique strategically circumscribed the notion of competitiveness, reducing it to internal power brokering, candidate selection processes, and a fundamental repudiation of broader social realities.

Urban Politics and Spatial Practices

Initial reflection suggested the phenomenon resembled less a conventional coup and more accurately a "putsch." This maneuver occurred within an operational politico-economic and administrative framework, exhibiting strong parallels to a coup but lacking its defining characteristic: the complete usurpation of state power. A putsch typically signifies an attempt by specific power centers with defined political objectives to realize those demands, often involving overt force and representing a resolution to conditions of dual power. However, the concept of a putsch presupposes a relative parity of power between contending factions, where the failure of the putsch implies the probable defeat of one by the other. The circumstances under examination do not conform to this model. Neither does it align with the numerous incremental authoritarian measures routinely employed by the incumbent regime for self-preservation.

Precedents for such an action within established democratic theory and empirical examples are scarce. The process observed under Putin in Russia involved a persistent curtailment of democratic potential—a phenomenon documented by Levitsky and Way. Hallmarks include the preemptive neutralization of any emergent democratic alternative and a concerted effort to preclude even the possibility of such alternatives arising; these are characteristic features of competitive authoritarianism. Putin, however, ultimately transcended this stage, transitioning towards overt authoritarianism through the declaration of a state of emergency, subsequently perpetuated via military conflict. While parallels exist, the correspondence is incomplete. The Turkish case appears more analogous to an "auto-golpe" (self-coup), reminiscent of certain historical instances in Latin American dictatorships and, to some extent, the military interventions witnessed within the Eastern Bloc (e.g., Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968). This involves the deliberate maintenance of social tension and the activation of potential political actors through continuous interventionist measures.

At the current apex of this induced tension, peaceful urban protest has emerged as the principal, perhaps sole remaining, modality of public reaction. As articulated by Lefebvre in his theory of the "production of space," the urban milieu of Istanbul—or indeed any city—functions not merely as a physical container but as a dynamic arena wherein social relations and political contestations are continually produced, transformed, and reproduced. İmamoğlu's pattern of electoral support at the mahalle level during the 2019 local elections serves to illuminate the political manifestations of these underlying spatial practices. Particularly noteworthy was the unexpected degree of support garnered in peripheral districts originating from gecekondu settlements (e.g., Bağcılar, Esenler, Sultanbeyli), indicating that spatial segregation does not invariably dictate political polarization in an absolute manner.

Correlating neighborhood-level voting patterns with socio-economic indicators reveals distinct political demarcations within the historic city center (e.g., Fatih, Eyüp, Üsküdar) and established middle-class districts (e.g., Kadıköy, Beşiktaş, Şişli). Conversely, the peripheral zones transformed from gecekondu areas exhibit more variegated electoral outcomes. This dynamic underscores the influence of quotidian material concerns—such as access to basic urban services, housing affordability, transportation, and infrastructure—on political preferences, aligning with Castells' (1977) concept of "collective consumption." The 2024 elections served as a potent reminder of the enduring relevance of a Castellsian (specifically, early Castells) urban sociology for understanding the Turkish context. They reaffirmed the proposition that the locus of potential democratization resides not within centralized institutions but emanates from local governance structures—from the cities themselves. The CHP's performance in these elections, representing the zenith of its historical electoral success, positioned it as the nation's preeminent political party.

Nevertheless, the inherent fragility of a city-centric democratic model became apparent under conditions where authoritarianism's most salient feature—intervention in societal strata beyond the immediate control of the ruling power—was actively practiced. Coupled with the effective silencing of the free press and the complete operationalization of executive tutelage (two critical conditions identified by Levitsky and Way), the limitations of such a model were stark. The preceding 23 years witnessed a cumulative series of interventions, predicated on plebiscitary democratic forms, which systematically eroded the powers of the legislative and judicial branches. The historical antecedents of these maneuvers can be traced back to the September 12, 2010, constitutional referendum—an event ultimately proving antithetical to its purported aim of democratization.

These actions aimed at neutralizing one of the three branches of government—legislative, executive, or judicial—either by transferring its functions to clandestine entities or by subordinating it entirely to an authoritarian executive. The April 17, 2017, referendum further stripped the legislature of its residual authority. These two constitutional referenda effectively marked the culmination, or perhaps termination, of Turkey's democratic experiment.

Carl Schmitt provides the most perspicuous theoretical lens for understanding the political maneuvers, not necessarily of Erdoğan himself, but of the principal policy architects within his administration. For years, I have endeavored to highlight the profound threat posed by this particular mode of political thought to democratic principles. Schmitt's core conceptualization posits politics as fundamentally grounded in a logic of enmity, demanding action predicated on an "us versus adversary" paradigm. Regrettably, Schmitt's ideas gained traction in Turkey, partly through their popularization by post-Marxist intellectuals. His philosophy resonated strongly with the worldview of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek and, relatedly, with archaic, synthetic forms of Ottomanism. Until this most recent juncture, analyzing potential government actions through the lens of Schmitt's likely strategies proved consistently the most logical and heuristically valuable approach.

Neoliberal Urbanization and Democratic Potentials

Adopting the framework of "actually existing neoliberalism" proposed by Brenner, Theodore, and Peck, it becomes imperative to recognize that Turkey's neoliberal urbanization process is intrinsically shaped by the dialectical interplay between global economic transformations and localized institutional configurations. To this analysis, I have sought to integrate Lefebvre's concept of "neo-dirigisme" (new statism), particularly pertinent from the 2000s onwards. This contemporary iteration of statism, however, diverges sharply from its earlier, public-oriented antecedent; it instead dedicates the entirety of its available state apparatus to facilitating neoliberal hyper-accumulation. Post-2002, Istanbul's urban landscape increasingly functioned as a laboratory for neoliberal policy experimentation, serving as the spatial substrate for capital accumulation processes actualized through urban transformation projects, the privatization of public lands, and the implementation of mega-projects.

İmamoğlu's electoral success in 2019 can be interpreted as the crystallization of urban opposition arising from the inherent contradictions generated by this neoliberal-neo-dirigiste (new-statist) mode of urbanization. The political outreach efforts of İmamoğlu and his team strategically targeted constituencies long marginalized by the established opposition: namely, the urban poor, alongside rapidly expanding segments within this demographic including retirees, youth (particularly university students), and women.

In the period following 2018, and with heightened intensity after 2020, Istanbul rapidly transformed into an increasingly unlivable environment, subjected to the triple bind of irrational economic policies, a severely depreciated Turkish Lira, official inflation statistics bearing little resemblance to lived reality, and wage adjustments (outside of electoral cycles) failing even to match these distorted inflation figures. As the Lira's function as a reliable store of value eroded, accumulated capital once again sought refuge in the housing market. This precipitated an unprecedented surge in both sales and rental prices, reaching levels previously unseen in Turkish history. Subsequent analysis will demonstrate that by late 2024, housing costs in Istanbul had converged with those observed in numerous developed Western metropolises, occurring concurrently with a precipitous decline in the real value of wages.

Minimum Wage in Turkey (2016-2025)

The metrics associated with the cost of living in Istanbul now substantially exceed the minimum wage benchmarks depicted above. In an urban context where residential rents commence at 20,000 Lira even within the most impoverished peripheral districts, the period of relatively broad-based prosperity (tabana yayılmış refah) characteristic of the 2010s rapidly ceded ground to pervasive sentiments of deprivation, poverty, and perceived injustice. This expansive working-class cohort, constrained to employment marginally above the minimum wage threshold, initially tended to attribute culpability to the sizable migrant populations—Syrian, Afghan, and others—numbering potentially in the hundreds of thousands, perhaps exceeding one million (precise data remains elusive).

Harvey's conceptualization of the "right to the city," famously elaborated in "Rebel Cities"—a text I was regrettably unable to assign in my own pedagogy—found its initial practical expression in the Gezi Protests of 2013, articulating the demand of inhabitants across Istanbul's diverse socio-spatial formations for democratic self-determination regarding the city's future. The most direct contemporary manifestation of this principle resides in the broad societal resonance generated by Ekrem İmamoğlu, particularly following his unjustified and extra-legal detention alongside his entire administrative team subsequent to securing three electoral mandates.

The March 19th intervention is most cogently interpreted as an authoritarian counter-response specifically targeting the ascendancy of this democratic potential. İmamoğlu's emphasis on transparency and accountability within urban governance, notably framed through his discourse concerning the "system of waste" (israf düzeni), presented a substantive alternative to the rent-seeking logic underpinning neoliberal urbanization. Viewed in this light, the March 19th events transcend mere political decapitation; they represent a concerted attempt to suppress burgeoning societal aspirations for democratic oversight of the urban domain. İmamoğlu had consistently demonstrated qualities of diligence and effective public service delivery since his tenure as Beylikdüzü mayor. As metropolitan mayor, these attributes were manifested through the rehabilitation of long-stalled metro lines, concerted efforts to address the vexing taxi shortage crippling urban mobility, and—particularly resonant for individuals like myself possessing expertise in architectural and art history and a deep appreciation for Istanbul's historical patrimony—the execution of remarkably meticulous and comprehensive renovation and restitution projects under the supervision of Mahir Polat, projects arguably unparalleled in contemporary global practice.

Of perhaps greater fundamental significance was the core message articulated during his initial campaign: the instillation of optimism within the vast, politically alienated populace of Istanbul. These were citizens exhausted by the perceived indifference of the established opposition, estranged from formal politics, and seemingly enveloped in a state of civic apathy (ölü toprağı serpilmiş). The slogan "her şey çok güzel olacak" (everything will be beautiful) served as the vessel for this renewed sense of possibility.

Hope arguably constitutes the most foundational political concept. From a more rigorously theoretical perspective, within the contemporary post-truth milieu, the capacity of local governance structures offering pragmatic solutions to tangible urban problems to garner support from social segments whose relationship to objective truth remains unsettled—or perhaps predetermined—constitutes a critical dimension of Istanbul's political dynamics.

As the preceding cartographic analysis demonstrates, İmamoğlu's success in constructing a cross-cutting electoral coalition encompassing voters from diverse political, ethnic, class, and cultural backgrounds established a vital threshold of hope. It simultaneously constituted a significant locus of resistance against the prevailing systemic trajectory in Turkey—an evolution from competitive authoritarianism towards potentially straightforward authoritarianism, possibly inflected with elements of religious totalitarianism given the augmented influence of Islamist motifs.

Conclusion: Urgent Democracy

The days subsequent to March 19th witnessed a surge of public protest across nearly all major Turkish cities, reaching a scale unprecedented since the Gezi demonstrations of June 2013. As it became evident that this wave of dissent was unlikely to dissipate spontaneously, authorities responded initially with widespread arrests. Subsequently, as reported by the few remaining independent media outlets and journalists via social media platforms (notably X, formerly Twitter), comprehensive and severe sanctions were enacted to curtail freedom of expression online.

The March 19th intervention transcends its immediate manifestation as the detention of a mayor and his associates—an event whose parallels lie primarily in the turbulent 1990s. It signifies a critical inflection point in Turkey's democratic trajectory. The phenomenon observed is not merely an isolated political maneuver but represents the culmination of a systematic erosion of democratic institutions, a process that has accelerated markedly since the constitutional referenda of 2010 and 2017. This transition from competitive authoritarianism towards a more entrenched authoritarian regime structure imperils the socio-economic fabric and future prospects of a nation once regarded as an exceptional model of democratic development globally. The consequences are already partially visible in rising social anomie, escalating crime rates, and the increasing banalization of violence within everyday life.

The widespread civic demonstrations following the March 19th intervention—the most significant since Gezi Park in 2013—underscore the profound depth of societal discontent and the enduring resilience of democratic aspirations among broad segments of the Turkish populace. These protests, concentrated in major urban centers but also manifesting in significant provincial cities, demonstrate that despite years of sustained democratic backsliding, the demands for political pluralism, governmental accountability, and meaningful representation remain deeply embedded within Turkish society. They effectively refuted prognostications suggesting that Turkey's two-century-long democratization trajectory could be summarily terminated by such a relatively straightforward intervention.

Turkey's perpetual economic crisis—characterized by virulent inflation and a precipitous decline in real wage levels, as visually represented earlier—has fostered conditions wherein democratic regression and material hardship exist in a mutually reinforcing, deleterious cycle. Empirical data unequivocally indicate a significant deterioration in the economic well-being of wage-earners since 2021, with nominal wage increases failing to offset the rapid erosion of real purchasing power. Within Istanbul, where the escalating cost of housing has rendered accommodation unaffordable even in peripheral districts, this combination of economic duress and attendant hopelessness has catalyzed an unanticipated political mobilization, seemingly catching the incumbent power structure unprepared.

The urban locus of Turkey's democratic struggle holds considerable significance. Contrary to the prevailing assumptions within mainstream social science, the historical impetus for democratization in Turkey has consistently emanated not from rural areas but from urban centers. This pattern is arguably linked to the fact that, during the critical period of integration into the world-economy in the 18th and 19th centuries, a substantial portion of the country already comprised small commodity producers.

Historically, the city has also functioned as a synonym for institutionality. Istanbul, serving as a demographic microcosm of the entire nation, reaffirms its role as the crucial crucible for democratic contestation. İmamoğlu's electoral success across diverse socio-spatial formations highlights the latent potential for constructing broad democratic coalitions capable of transcending conventional political, ethnic, and class cleavages.

An urgent recalibration towards a democratic path for Turkey is not merely a normative desideratum but a pragmatic imperative for navigating the nation's multifaceted crises. An opposition focused on achieving democratic restoration in the near term might reasonably be expected to prioritize the following strategic objectives:

• Implementation of an emergency economic program designed to shield the most vulnerable societal segments from the impacts of the impending global economic downturn, the arrival of which now appears certain rather than merely probable.
• Supplementing the aforementioned emergency program with direct employment subsidies and concerted efforts to reorient employment away from inefficient, security-focused state sectors towards value-generating economic activities.
• Fostering social reconciliation through the establishment of inclusive platforms for dialogue spanning diverse political, religious, and cultural constituencies.
• Prioritizing urban regeneration guided by principles of transparent, participatory governance, as opposed to prevailing models characterized by self-interested, rent-seeking development—the human cost of which, particularly concerning high-density construction, was tragically underscored during recent seismic events.
• Pursuing national stability grounded in sustainable economic integration, achieved by aligning Turkey with international democratic values and norms amidst an increasingly unstable global economic order.

The civic resilience demonstrated in response to the March 19th intervention attests to the enduring vitality of democratic aspirations, persisting even in the face of repressive state measures. While international solidarity can potentially play a catalytic role, the ultimate determination of Turkey's democratic future rests intrinsically with its own citizenry and their continued insistence upon accountability, transparency, and genuine representation.

The present conjuncture presents both profound perils and latent possibilities for transformation. Echoing Lefebvre, the production of democratic space within Turkey necessitates a radical reinterpretation of the "right to the city"—understood not merely as access to urban resources, but encompassing the collective agency to fundamentally reshape the processes of urbanization and, by extension, the political system itself.

In summation, Turkey currently stands at a decisive crossroads. The authoritarian consolidation epitomized by the March 19th intervention poses a tangible threat of foreclosing democratic possibilities for generations to come. Yet, the widespread civil, passive, and peaceful resistance mounted against this action underscores the enduring nature of the democratic impulse. A return to democracy for Turkey is not only desirable but constitutes an urgent necessity for ensuring economic vitality, social cohesion, and the nation's constructive engagement within the international community. The critical question remains: can this extant democratic potential successfully overcome the formidable entrenched interests and institutional impediments currently obstructing its realization?

Turkey requires democracy—now. The specific paradigm—liberal or otherwise—is secondary. Even a flawed, incomplete, deficient, or defective democracy is preferable. Echoing the sentiment once expressed by the band Bulutsuzluk Özlemi, what is needed is "Acil Demokrasi"—Urgent Democracy.

References

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Castells, M. (1977) The urban question : a Marxist approach. London: Edward Arnold (Social structure and social change ).

Esen, B. and Gumuscu, S. (2016) ‘Rising competitive authoritarianism in Turkey’, Third World Quarterly, 37(9), pp. 1581–1606. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1135732.

Esen, B. and Gumuscu, S. (2019) ‘Killing competitive authoritarianism softly: the 2019 local elections in Turkey’, South European Society and Politics, 24(3), pp. 317–342.

Harvey, D. (2001) ‘From Managerialism to Entrepreneuralism: the transformation in urban governance in late capitalism’, in Space of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography. New York: Routledge.

Harvey, D. (2015) Asi Şehirler. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları.

Jessop, B. (2002) The Future of the Capitalist State. Wiley.

Levitsky, S. and Way, L.A. (2002) ‘Elections without democracy: The rise of competitive authoritarianism’, Journal of democracy, 13(2), pp. 51–65.

Levitsky, S. and Way, L.A. (2010) Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge University Press.